> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.strike.fun/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.strike.fun/technical/security.md).

# Security

## Smart Contract Security

### Reentrancy Protection

External state-changing functions use OpenZeppelin `ReentrancyGuard` where needed, and follow checks-effects-interactions.

### Access Control

| Function                                   | Access                                     |
| ------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------ |
| `placeOrder()` / `cancelOrder()`           | Anyone with sufficient balance/approval    |
| `clearBatch()`                             | Anyone                                     |
| `resolveMarket()`                          | Anyone with valid Pyth data and update fee |
| `finalizeResolution()`                     | Anyone after finality                      |
| `redeem()`                                 | Eligible token/position holders            |
| `createMarket()`                           | `MARKET_CREATOR_ROLE`                      |
| `pauseFactory()` / lifecycle admin actions | `ADMIN_ROLE`                               |
| `setProtocolFeeCollector()`                | `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` on FeeModel           |

### Bounded Iteration

Segment trees provide O(log N) price-level operations. Order counts and resting-order scans are capped. Batch settlement is chunked (`SETTLE_CHUNK_SIZE = 400`) so gas per `clearBatch` call remains bounded.

### Emergency Controls

* Markets can be halted/resumed or deactivated by authorized operators.
* Unresolved markets can be cancelled through the configured fallback path, enabling refunds.
* Vault emergency mode has a timelock before emergency withdrawals.

### Anti-Spam / DoS Prevention

* Minimum lot sizes prevent dust orders.
* Full collateral locking creates an economic cost for spam.
* `MAX_USER_ORDERS = 20` per market prevents a single address from flooding the book.
* Resting orders far from the clearing price are parked outside the active segment tree while still locking collateral.

## Oracle Security

### Pyth Integration

* Pyth update data is verified on-chain.
* `parsePriceFeedUpdates` reads the settlement-window price without relying on a pre-updated on-chain price.
* Confidence checks reject updates with excessive uncertainty.
* Fallback windows handle rare Pyth publishing delays.

### Resolution Safety

* First valid submission starts a 90-second finality window.
* During finality, an earlier valid update can challenge only if it changes the outcome.
* Finalization is permissionless after the finality window.
* Each market can only be finalized once.

## Trading Safety

* Orderbook trades are fully collateralized with locked USDT or locked positions.
* Pool markets are backed by their configured collateral.
* No margin or liquidation mechanics.
* Users can cancel open orders while the market is active.

## Auditing

### Internal Audit v1.2

An internal security audit (v1.2) covered the core contracts, including fee split logic, chunked settlement, resting orders, and per-user order caps. See [Internal Audit v1.2](/technical/internal-audit-v1.2.md).

### World Cup Multiplier Cross-Event Ticket Internal Review

An internal Codex-assisted review covered the World Cup Multiplier cross-event Prediction Ticket refactor. This was not an external third-party audit. See [World Cup Multiplier Cross-Event Ticket Internal Review](/technical/world-cup-multiplier-predictions-v0-audit.md).